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mplementation of monetary policy by most nations’ cen-
tral banks hinges on setting three interest rates: a lending
rate, a remuneration rate, and a policy target rate. The
lending rate, also widely referred to as the discount rate or
the primary credit rate, is the rate of interest charged to
financial institutions by the central bank for collateralized
loans. The remuneration rate is the rate of interest paid to
financial institutions by the central bank on certain deposits
held at the central bank. The policy target rate is the level of
an otherwise-market-determined interest rate that the central
bank seeks to induce via specific market interventions. Taken
together, these rates summarize the price(s) at which central
banks provide liquidity to financial markets when they
exchange interest-bearing assets that are not media of
exchange for deposits at the central bank.
In practice, the policy target rate of most central banks is
the one-day (overnight) repurchase (RP) rate on government
(Treasury) securities. Generally, the remuneration rate is set
below the policy target rate, which, in turn, is set below the
lending rate; a frequent pattern is a remuneration rate 25 basis
points below and a lending rate 25 basis points above, respec-
tively, the target rate. Historically, the Federal Reserve has not
followed this practice—its target has been the overnight federal
funds rate. When making cross-country comparisons, note
that during periods of economic normalcy the rate of interest
on uncollateralized federal funds lending typically exceeds by
10 basis points the overnight RP rate. Before October 2008,
the remuneration rate was set at zero (that is, no interest was
paid on deposits at Federal Reserve Banks), and the lending
rate (discount rate) was set below the policy target rate.1 On
March 17, 2008, the Federal Reserve adopted a temporary
policy, in effect at the time of this writing and to remain in
effect until financial market stress abates, that the primary
credit rate shall be 25 basis points greater than the target fed-
eral funds rate. (In addition, the term of primary credit loans
was extended for up to 90 days.)
On October 9, 2008, the Federal Reserve initiated interest
payments on deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, as authorized
by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. Although the
act was a response to recent financial market disruptions, pay-
ing interest on deposits long had been advocated as a means
to “level the playing field” between depository financial insti-
tutions subject to statutory reserve requirements and their not-
so-encumbered competitors. This argument, today, is moot
because the widespread adoption and low-cost availability of
retail deposit sweep programs has made statutory reserve
requirements a “voluntary tax” in the sense that banks may use
such programs to reduce the requirement’s burden to near
zero.2 A second traditional argument for interest payments,
however, retains its force—in the absence of binding statutory
reserve requirements, interest payments will ease the Open
Market Desk’s daily task of maintaining the market’s federal
funds rate close to the desired target level because it reduces,
to some extent, variation in banks’ holdings of deposits at the
Federal Reserve Banks.
Since the inception of interest payments, the Federal
Reserve has maintained a two-tier pricing scheme. As of this
writing (November 21), the Federal Reserve’s remuneration rate
on “required” reserve balances—that is, deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements—
equals the reserve maintenance period’s average target federal
funds rate, while the remuneration rate on deposits in excess
of this amount equals the maintenance period’s lowest target
federal funds rate.3 Previously, between October 6 and
November 5, the payment rate on required balances was the
maintenance period’s average federal funds target minus 10
basis points (approximately equal to the overnight RP rate
on Treasuries). For excess balances, between October 6 and
October 22 the payment rate equaled the maintenance period’s
lowest federal funds rate target less 75 basis points, and between
October 23 and November 5 equalled the maintenance period’s
lowest federal funds rate target minus 35 basis points. In its
November 5 press release, the Board of Governors said the
most recent changes “would help foster trading in the funds
market at rates closer to the FOMC’s target federal funds rate,”
echoing Chairman Bernanke’s comments on October 7:
The expansion of Federal Reserve lending is helping finan-
cial firms cope with reduced access to their usual sources of
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“Paying interest on reserves 
should allow us to better control 
the federal funds rate.”
—Chairman Ben Bernankefunding. Recently, however, our liquidity provision had
begun to run ahead of our ability to absorb excess reserves
held by the banking system, leading the effective funds rate,
on many days, to fall below the target set by the Federal
Open Market Committee. This problem has largely been
addressed by a provision of the legislation the Congress
passed last week, which gives the Federal Reserve the
authority to pay interest on balances that depository insti-
tutions hold in their accounts at the Federal Reserve Banks.
The Federal Reserve announced yesterday that it will pay
interest on required reserve balances at 10 basis points
below the target federal funds rate, and pay interest on
excess reserves, initially at 75 basis points below the target.
Paying interest on reserves should allow us to better control
the federal funds rate, as banks are unlikely to lend overnight
balances at a rate lower than they can receive from the Fed;
thus, the payment of interest on reserves should set a floor
for the funds rate over the day. With this step, our lending
facilities may be more easily expanded as necessary. So long
as financial conditions warrant, we will continue to look
for ways to reduce funding pressures in key markets.
Yet, some questions must be asked about the operation of
a market in which the three rates of monetary policy are nearly
equal (leaving aside the trivial difference between average and
lowest federal funds targets during a reserve maintenance
period, and the 25-basis-point premium of the primary credit
rate above the target federal funds rate). Market analysts in
public reports have noted that federal funds market trading
volumes fell sharply after the Federal Reserve initiated interest
payments on excess deposits at Federal Reserve Banks. It seems
reasonable that trading volume will decrease further, perhaps
to zero, as the remuneration, primary credit, and target rates
are brought together. However, because the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act only authorizes the payment of
interest on deposits at Federal Reserve Banks held by deposi-
tory financial institutions, the remuneration does not place a
floor under the market federal funds rate. At times, a deposi-
tory institution may wish to sell funds at a lower or higher rate
to specific institutions. Also, nonbank institutions ineligible
for interest payments may sell federal funds directly to other
institutions rather than transfer their balances to an institution
that will impose a transactions fee before passing through the
interest they would receive from the Federal Reserve. Recent
public reports from market analysts show that federal funds,
as of this writing, have been trading recently in the range of
0.20 to 0.25 percent, one-quarter of the FOMC’s target.
Looking forward, it is likely that setting the remuneration
rate at the federal funds target will, indeed, push the measured
(“effective”) daily federal funds rate closer to the FOMC’s
target.4 But it also seems likely that this change will exacerbate
recent sharp decreases in daily trading volume, perhaps risk-
ing the long-term viability of the federal funds market itself.
Further, this setting might harm long-standing correspondent/
respondent relationships between financial institutions. His  -
torically, the federal funds interbank lending market arose
during the 1920s when a Federal Reserve member banker noted
that other member banks were borrowing at the discount
window while he held non-interest-bearing excess reserve
deposits at his Federal Reserve Bank. Sensing a profit oppor-
tunity, he risked lending his excess deposit balances to a fellow
Federal Reserve member bank. His success was soon emulated
by others. These incentives vanish (except for minor frictions)
when the three rates of monetary policy coincide.
The experiences of other central banks, and a bit of basic
economics, suggest an additional motivation for changing
the remuneration rate, beyond that mentioned in the Board’s
November 5 press release—a smaller gap between the remu-
neration rate and the target rate may increase sharply banks’
willingness to hold deposits with the central bank. In New
Zealand, for example, deposits held at the Reserve Bank more
than doubled after interest payments began. Federal Reserve
programs implemented since the mid-September failure of
Lehman Brothers that seek to restore credit activity in the
economy’s nonbank financial sector have added large amounts
of liquidity to financial markets—but most also have caused
large increases in the excess deposits held by depository insti-
tutions at the Federal Reserve Banks. To the extent that the
Federal Reserve seeks to continue and expand such programs
in nonbank financial markets, it will be crucial to provide
incentives for depository institutions to hold ever-increasing
amounts of deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks. ￿
1 Before the Monetary Control Act in 1980, the Federal Reserve furnished payment-
related services at no charge to its member banks.
2 See, for example, Richard G. Anderson and Robert H. Rasche, “Retail Sweep
Programs and Bank Reserves, 1994-1999,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, January/February 2001, 83(1), pp. 51-72; and Richard G. Anderson and
Suresh K. Nair, “A Specialized Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail
Sweeps,” Production Optimization and Management Science, May 2008, 17(3),
pp. 285-95.
3 A reserve maintenance period is a 14-day period ending Wednesday during
which a depository institution that is subject to the Federal Reserve’s statutory
reserve requirements must hold sufficient quantities of vault cash and/or deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks to satisfy a reserve requirement that is calculated from
the institution’s deposit liabilities during a corresponding reserve computation
period. The reserve computation period is a 14-day period that ends on the Monday
that is 30 days prior to the ending date of the reserve maintenance period. 
4 The FOMC sets its target as a desired level of the federal funds rate during a
reserve maintenance period. In addition, it desires that the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York’s Open Market Desk minimize day-to-day volatility in the rate. The
“effective” rate is calculated each day as a volume-weighted average of rates paid
by federal funds borrowers, as reported to the Open Market Desk by federal funds
brokers in New York City. 
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